A file held at the Public Record Office in Belfast includes the minutes of a meeting which took place at Stormont House.

A meeting at Stormont discussed the use of anti-terrorism laws to combat displays of paramilitary flags and murals in 2004, according to declassified files.

The papers reveal that a senior PSNI official said “comprehensive case law” could be developed within the courts to establish a “clear line between what is acceptable and what is not”.

A file held at the Public Record Office in Belfast includes the minutes of a meeting which took place at Stormont House on March 2, 2004, attended by PSNI representatives, civil servants and representatives from the Community Relations Unit (CRU) and the Community Relations Council (CRC).

The minutes indicate that a previous meeting concluded that a “community approach to the flag issue was preferable to a police-only response.”

Senior officer Gary White told the meeting he had had a discussion with the Crown Prosecution Service regarding the use of the Terrorism Act 2000.

The minute read: “Again, the question of what is and is not acceptable behavior has become an issue, but GW (Gary White) believes that the DPP is in favor of using this provision generally and this is easiest where a flag or mural illustrates an explicit level of support for a paramilitary organization.

“Obviously there will be areas where there will be doubts about what a flag is.

“GW suggested that this issue should be left to the courts and that comprehensive case law could be developed to establish a clear line between what is acceptable and what is not.

“He also reminded the group that there is great sympathy for the idea that what was acceptable during the worst phases of the Troubles may not be acceptable now.”

The minutes indicate that the meeting recalls a test case relating to the display of paramilitary flags in Hollywood, which resulted in the conviction of four people under section 13 of the Terrorism Act.

It was subsequently learned that the CRU had commissioned research from the Institute of Irish Studies at Queen’s University into the issue of flags and emblems.

The CRU’s Billy Gamble said “his preference was for the community to resolve these issues on their own”, but he felt there “had to be a threat of final sanction”.

The minutes state: “The group was clearly impressed by the approaches of the CRU/CRC and expects the outcome of the policy document in June.

“It is clear, however, that there will be times when the community simply cannot stop the paramilitaries from engaging in this activity.

“In such circumstances, the PSNI is content to have the necessary powers under the Terrorism Act to deal with the situation. In short, there is no universal policy that can solve the flag problem.”

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A senior civil servant noted that “there were a few surprises” in contacts but that Dr McAleese was determined to expand the list of his “loyalist friends” to include the UVF.

One of the files released under the 20-year regime concerns Dr. McAleese’s efforts to force loyalist paramilitaries from the margins of the peace process during his wife’s first term as president.

The extent of his contacts is contained in a confidential memo written to the then British Ambassador to Ireland, Stewart Eldon, by senior civil servant Chris McCabe in September 2003, entitled “Loyalism and the Irish: Lunch with Martin McAleese”. Mr McCabe said he had a “private conversation” with Martin McAleese over lunch.

The memo said: “Martin McAleese is very candid about his contacts with high-ranking loyalists. Impressive in both their breadth and depth. Well aware of the potential pitfalls, but so far things have gone remarkably well.

“Determined to persevere for as long as possible, expanding the list of his loyalist ‘friends’ at every opportunity.”

Mr. McCabe added:

This allowed us to hear firsthand what Martin was doing: although we were already aware of much of what he told us, there were a few surprises.

The note stated that Dr McAleese had received a letter from “South Belfast UDA Brigadier” Jackie McDonald in February 2003.

“Once Martin verified that there would be no political objections to such a personal initiative, the first meeting was arranged. Since then, the meetings seem to have taken on a life of their own.”

The memo details a list of contacts, including a meeting in Áras an Uachtaráin “involving 50 unionists/loyalists who focused on cross-community issues”. It also included “several meetings with UDA brigadiers (including a “jovial” Jim Gray) and others in which Jackie McDonald was clearly primus inter pares”.

The note continues: “Social events, including golf outings, in which some or all UDA brigadiers and their associates were involved. On one of these occasions, Martin called for a coach, but the brigadiers refused him on grounds of collective security and because it would be too much like a UDA day trip.

“Alternative transportation in a fleet of minibuses was agreed; each vehicle was checked for ‘bugs and bombs’ before its guests boarded!”

The note said Dr McAleese had “admitted to being relatively innocent abroad”, but added that he was struck by “the sincerity of everyone he met and would tend to take them at face value until he knew otherwise”.

The note adds: “For our part, we welcomed his initiative and the progress that has been made. We said that, given the provenance of some of the figures involved and the need for transparency, accountability and inter- and intra-community equality, we could not hope to match his activities on this side of the border.

“But that shouldn’t bother him, quite the contrary.”

The memo was copied to Secretary of State Paul Murphy and other Northern Ireland ministers in direct power. The note concluded by stating that Dr McAleese also wanted to make contact with someone on the “military side” of the UVF.

It said: “To ensure the PUP/UVF stays on board, he would have dinner with the party’s chairman, David Rose, and secretary, Dawn Purvis, later this week.

“He hoped this would lead to direct contact with someone on the military side. He also has tentative plans for some sort of dialogue with members of the DUP.”

The Taoiseach gave a speech at a dinner in the English capital on Armistice Day, where he said he and Mr Major had “worked closely together to advance the peace process”.

John Major has written to John Bruton to reprimand him for a speech in London which allegedly caused “a storm” in 1995 while he was “up to his eyes” in New Zealand.

The Taoiseach gave a speech at a dinner in the English capital on Armistice Day, where he said he and Mr Major had “worked closely together to advance the peace process”.

He said that “at this critical moment” there was a need to reach a “reasonable compromise” in all-party talks and called for respect for the “dignity” of the nationalist community.

“Unionists need to understand that their refusal to admit that police powers have been misused under the Stormont regime reduces the effectiveness of the RUC in nationalist areas to date,” he told the Meath Association of London dinner at the Copthorne Tara Hotel.

“This is a problem that unionist representatives can help to overcome, by accepting the negative aspects of their predecessors’ past relationships with their nationalist neighbors, particularly in the area of ​​policing.”

Mr Major was at Auckland Airport about to board a plane to London when he wrote to Mr Bruton the next day.

“I must say that I am very surprised (by this speech) and I regret that you spoke in this way,” declared the British Prime Minister.

He said unionists were “required” to infer that the Irish government was “strongly opposed to them” and could not play an intermediary role with the British government.

“(Northern Ireland Secretary of State) Paddy Mayhew had to set the record straight. You left him with no options.

“However, we will do everything in our power to calm the storm that your speech will inevitably raise.”

He recalled a meeting held in Israel with US President Bill Clinton, as the leaders attended the funeral of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

He said he had received two letters from Mr Bruton and hoped to discuss the first with him after he returned from New Zealand, but was “sorry to see that elements of your letter were leaked to the Irish press shortly after you sent it”.

He said he had been busy dealing with various international issues and said it was not easy “to have the pulse of Northern Ireland”.

“I was up to my eyeballs in a very difficult situation, faced first with acute concerns about French nuclear testing in the Pacific, and then with the Nigerian crisis. »

He said he knew Mr Bruton was “under a lot of pressure at home”.

Referring to the US president’s planned visit to the island of Ireland in late December, he said: “We must not allow (Gerry) Adams’ conscious efforts to build pressure ahead of Bill Clinton’s visit to panic us or throw us off course.”

“You have shown your ability, more than any other Taoiseach, to recognize that there are two sides to the Northern Ireland problem and that we will only solve it if we address both.”

He asked the two sides to speak by telephone in the coming days.

“In the meantime, I urge you to do everything you can to calm the atmosphere. I will do the same.”

Two days later, in response to a Dail question from Bertie Ahern, Mr Bruton said Mr Major had, at the weekend, “expressed the view that a common approach on the dual track strategy was the best way to proceed”.

The relationship between the two leaders contrasts sharply with the warmth between Mr Major and Mr Bruton’s predecessor, Albert Reynolds.

Mr Major wrote to Mr Reynolds in November 1994 after his resignation as leader of the Taoiseach and Fianna Fail, where he praised him for creating “virtually from the day you took office… an entirely different relationship”.

“You and I have worked together in a way that no holder of our office has done in the 70-plus years since the division of Ireland.

“We have worked to address some of the lingering consequences of the past and, above all, we have done everything in our power to bring peace to Northern Ireland.

“Your commitment to this cause, your energy and your dedication have made a vital difference. »

– This article is based on documents contained in file labeled 2025/115/827 in the National Archives of Ireland.